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Platformization of Cultural Production
Lonely, I feel alive,
I just wanna touch the sky.
And you, girl please don’t cry,
You know I’m your Mr.Right！
Boy, playing guitar,
Girl, loving her star,
And together we sing a song that will take me to your heart!
—Lonely Hero, 一人我饮酒醉， 
translated by Jiu Xing (2016)
Introduction
The above words are uttered by a young man in a black 
sleeveless T-shirt sitting in front of a computer screen; Tian 
You is his name and he calls himself an MC.1 In a recorded 
live-streaming video, he expresses his anger at the preva-
lence of discrimination, the unequal distribution of wealth, 
and social inequality in the form of Hanmai2 (喊麦), a 
Chinese rap-like performance that has been popular on the 
Internet since 2014. Thanks to live-streaming platforms like 
YY and Kuaishou (快手), its particular combination of coarse 
narration and rhythmical music is now celebrated by millions 
of young Chinese. Not long ago, Li Tianyou, which is Tian 
You’s real name, was a scrawny high-school dropout strug-
gling to make a living in a small, dreary industrial city in 
north-eastern China. Since 2014, he has been one of the best-
known Chinese “Internet celebrities,” commanding a fan base 
of over 35 million people for his live-streaming shows on 
Kuaishou and earning more than €1.8 million a year in pay-
ments from his fans and advertisers. And Tian You is not 
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Platformization of the Unlikely Creative 
Class: Kuaishou and Chinese Digital 
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Abstract
This article studies the platformization of cultural production in China through the specific lens of Kuaishou, an algorithm-
based video-sharing platform targeting second- and third-tier cities as well as the countryside. It enables the forming of an 
“unlikely” creative class in contemporary China. Kuaishou’s platform business fits into the Party State’s socio-economic 
agenda of “Internet+” and “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation,” and is also folded into the state’s demand for cultural 
censorship and social stability. As we will show, this state-commerce relationship largely shapes Kuaishou’s interface and its 
affordances as encoded in its algorithm. Nevertheless, Kuaishou enables the diverse, often marginalized, Chinese living outside 
the urban centers of the country to become “unlikely” creative workers, who have become self-employed creative, digital 
entrepreneurs. For these “grassroots individuals,” creativity, life, and individuality are constantly mobilized and calculated 
according to the workings of the platform. This grassroots entrepreneurship, in tandem with the institutional regulation and 
censorship of the Internet, contributes to the transformation of Chinese economy and the production of social stability and 
a digital culture permeated with contingency and negotiation.
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alone. Enabled by emerging Chinese digital platforms, thou-
sands of young Chinese like him are posting images, short 
videos, and making live-streaming shows to flaunt their cre-
ative talents while also hoping to earn a lot of money. Most 
of them are uneducated young Chinese from small cities and 
rural areas. They earn an average monthly income ranging 
from RMB2,000 (€250) to RMB4,000 (€500); successful 
ones can earn as much as 1 million (€120,000) per month 
(Arcbering, 2017; Hernández, 2017).
However, this new form of creative business is not with-
out risks. The ranting style of performance and its enormous 
popularity with massive online fan bases have also troubled 
the Chinese authorities. In early 2018, Tian You was accused 
by China Central Television, the central television network 
controlled by the state, of talking about pornography and 
drugs during his live streaming. Shortly after, Tian You and 
some other top-ranked live streamers were banned by all 
Chinese platforms and their performing careers seemed to 
have come to an end (Chen, 2018).
When thinking about the “creative class” (Florida, 2002), 
one tends to imagine an urban elite, an educated group of pre-
dominantly young people who work in the cultural industries 
and gather in hipster bars, dressed in the latest local and cos-
mopolitan designer brands. But, as the story of Tian You 
shows, the emerging digital and platform economy also offers 
opportunities for lower educated, more marginal people to 
participate as producers in the Chinese creative economies. 
According to the White Paper on Chinese Digital Economy 
2016 released by the Cyberspace Administration of China 
(CAC), the national administrative bureau in charge of the 
Chinese Internet communication sector, China’s digital eco-
nomic aggregate in 2016 reached RMB226 billion, constitut-
ing 30.3% of China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (CAC, 
2017a, p. 19). More importantly, the convergence of tradi-
tional sectors and digital Internet technology has replaced the 
ICT (information, communication, and technology) manufac-
turing, telecommunication, and software industries to become 
the “main engine” of the Chinese digital economy (CAC, 
2017a, p. 24). Various digital platforms such as Taobao and 
Wechat have played a crucial role in such convergence pro-
cesses, forming the so-called platform economy. In the media 
and cultural sectors, digital convergence has contributed 
45.4% of the total economic growth in the broadcast, televi-
sion, film, and recording industries. According to Nieborg 
and Poell (2018, p. 2), such platformization marks “the 
penetration of economic, governmental, and infrastructural 
extensions of digital platforms into the web and app ecosys-
tems, fundamentally affecting the operations of the cultural 
industries.” Data-based digital/Internet technologies afford 
platforms like Kuaishou a high degree of connectivity that 
allows them to mediate between various actors, including 
content producers, end-users, and advertisers and to incorpo-
rate them into the platform-dominated network system of “the 
multi-sided markets” (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017; Nieborg 
& Poell, 2018). The platformization of cultural production 
blurs the boundaries between traditional media forms and 
gives rise to an exponential growth of user-generated content 
production. The multi-sided network system not only enables 
traditional media companies to expand their content business, 
but also, as Tian You’s story shows, produces opportunities 
for marginalized individuals to become self-employed “cre-
ative workers.”
In this article, we want to investigate this emerging yet 
“unlikely” creative class in China, which is part of the rapid 
platformization of Chinese cultural production, and engage 
with the aesthetics of the work this class produces. How are 
these diverse and sometimes marginal groups of individuals 
and their creativities mobilized and incorporated into the 
platform creative economy? What kinds of aesthetics and 
culture are produced on these content platforms? How does 
platformization relate to the Chinese state’s governance of 
culture, economy, and society? And what are the differences 
and similarities between Chinese platformed cultural pro-
duction and its counterpart in “the west”? To address these 
questions, the article focuses on one particular platform, 
Kuaishou. Labeled by Chinese mainstream media as “revit-
alising Chinese rural culture” (Liu, 2017), the app attracts 
hundreds of millions of Chinese from the countryside and 
the second- and third-tier cities. Since its launch in 2012, it 
has become one of the most popular video-sharing platforms 
in China, allowing its users not only to watch, make, and 
distribute various genres of short videos, but also to become 
“complementors” of the platform (Nieborg & Poell, 2018): 
professional content producers contributing to the plat-
formization of cultural production in China. Before moving 
to our analysis, we first discuss the Chinese processes of 
platformization.
This article starts with an introduction to the issue of digi-
tal labor, the political economy of the Chinese platform cre-
ative economy, and the specific position of Kuaishou in this 
system. We distance ourselves from viewing digital labor 
solely in terms of exploitation and precarity. We will then 
show how the Chinese platform cultural economy distin-
guishes itself from its Western counterparts in its special 
state-platform relations, which simultaneously promote and 
limit platformization. The close link with the state is seen to 
constitute a third dimension of contingency, in addition to 
“platform dependence” and “contingent commodities,” iden-
tified by Nieborg and Poell (2018) as the forms of contin-
gency characterizing the Western platform cultural economy, 
which we will elaborate on below. The following section ana-
lyzes the workings of the Kuaishou platform. Using the 
“walkthrough” method of Light, Burgess, and Duguay (2018, 
p. 882), “a way of engaging directly with an app’s interface to 
examine its technological mechanisms and embedded cul-
tural references to understand how it guides users and shapes 
their experiences,” we examine how the contingent platform 
business induced by the complicated state-commerce rela-
tionship is encoded in the algorithms of Kuaishou. Finally, to 
probe the characteristics of this unlikely creative class and the 
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specific aesthetics they produce, we analyze 200 trending 
videos and the everyday user activities of 20 popular Kuaishou 
accounts.3 Besides conducting a visual and digital analysis of 
the videos, we held 14 in-depth interviews with managers 
from the Kuaishou company, content producers, algorithm 
engineers, and other professionals, whose work is related to 
Kuaishou and the Chinese platform creative economy. We 
argue that the platformization of cultural production in China 
accommodates the state’s “entrepreneurial solutionism,” while 
also producing a digital creative entrepreneurship among 
Chinese “grassroots individuals” and a dynamic digital cul-
ture permeated with contingency and negotiation.
Digital Labor and the Chinese 
Platformed Cultural Economy
As a global phenomenon, the platform economy has been 
extensively criticized for the type of labor it involves. Van 
Doorn, for example, notes that in the platform economy 
contracted labor has been replaced by “platform labor,” 
which adopts “a more austere and zero-liability peer-to-
peer model that leverages software to optimize labor’s flex-
ibility, scalability, tractability, and its fragmentation” (van 
Doorn, 2017, p. 901). In this sense, workers are regarded as 
complementors or subcontractors, instead of employees, of 
the platform companies, which are therefore exempted 
from providing labor protection. Critical political econo-
mists have also attacked content-based platforms for delib-
erately inviting users to become “prosumers” and thus 
contributing to the exploitation of free, creative labor 
(Fuchs, 2010; Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010).
Although these arguments provide valuable insights into 
the new labor conditions in the global platform economy, 
they tend to overlook the active agency or personal practices 
of digital/platform creators. The “multi-sided markets” of 
platform businesses suggest a more complicated relation-
ship among different actors in the operation of platformiza-
tion. The networked mode of cultural production indicates 
that “the costs of the production and consumption of goods 
and services” will affect other complementors of the plat-
form such as content producers and advertisers, and vice 
versa (Nieborg & Poell, 2018, p. 4). As the word “comple-
mentor” implies, the commercial relationship between plat-
form companies and complementors is not only exploitative, 
but also collaborative and symbiotic. The long-term finan-
cial success of digital platforms is thus not simply based on 
the exploitation of platform labor, but is contingent upon 
commercial collaboration between platform companies, 
content producers, and other complementors. In the case of 
Kuaishou, as we will show in the following sections, by 
actively utilizing the digital system afforded by the plat-
form, “grassroots” content producers are enabled to develop 
a digital creative entrepreneurship.
In the development of the platform economy, the Chinese 
state is a crucial agent. As Yu Hong (2017a, pp. 10-13) 
illustrates, the Chinese government has pledged to place 
information and communication at the center of the national 
economic restructuring plan, using ICT as industries and 
infrastructures to transform traditional industrial sectors. 
However, as Tian You’s experience shows, the state not 
only wants to “profit” from information and culture, but 
also to control and shape it so as to maintain social and 
political stability. With regard to Kuaishou, therefore, we 
need to begin by asking how this platform’s cultural econ-
omy is governed by the Chinese state. How does state gov-
ernance affect the working experience of the various 
platform content creators?
In 2015, Prime Minister Li Keqiang announced China’s 
“Internet+” agenda. This is a new national development 
strategy that aims at boosting and restructuring the national 
economy through the upgrading of digital infrastructure 
and technological innovation (The State Council, 2015b). 
“Internet+” is the continuation of the state’s economic 
restructuring plan, which aims to replace the unsustain-
able “export-driven,” “investment-dependent” model with 
a “consumption-based” and “innovation-driven” economy. 
The new policy agenda puts the “Internet” at the center, 
aiming to integrate network connectivity and the “disruptive 
business and managerial model” (of decentralized, private, 
post-Fordist corporate management) with a wide range of 
traditional sectors, from manufacturing, agriculture, energy, 
finance, and transportation to public services and education 
(Hong, 2017b; The State Council, 2015b). Moreover, the 
“Internet+” strategy pledges to propel a new digital econ-
omy that can foster and benefit small start-ups, entrepre-
neurship and innovation. As such, it dovetails with another 
policy agenda championed by the state government under 
the name “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation” (大众创
业万众创新 dazhong chuangxin, wanzhong chuangye) (The 
State Council, 2015a). The latter policy seeks to mobilize 
the creativity and innovative power of grassroots individu-
als for national economic growth. “Internet+” complements 
the “Mass Entrepreneurship” strategy in the sense that the 
prosperous digital economy provides opportunities for 
grassroots individuals to find employment and become 
entrepreneurs. According to Premier Li Keqiang,
Internet+ not only produces new economic driving power, but 
also creates the largest platform for the sharing economy, 
which stages “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation” and 
will deeply affect our economy, society and everyday life. It 
provides opportunities for not only techno elites and 
entrepreneurs, but also millions of caogen (草根grassroots 
individuals) to exploit their talent and to realise their special 
value. (Li, 2018)
In practice, as the official statistics cited earlier indicate, the 
state agenda of “Internet+” and “Mass Entrepreneurship” has 
greatly contributed to the surging platformed creative econ-
omy in China. Kuaishou, together with its competitors such 
as Toutiao and Douyin,4 enables both traditional media 
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companies and Chinese “grassroots individuals” to establish 
and expand their content business.5
Launched in 2012, Kuaishou is an algorithm-based video 
and live-streaming platform that allows registered users to 
create and post all kinds of short videos online. These videos 
show activities ranging from cooking, body building, skills 
training, and applying make-up to micro fiction films. The 
remarkably diverse content made by millions of online users 
is computed and pushed to targeted viewers by Kuaishou’s 
algorithm recommendation system. This algorithm system, 
as Gillespie (2014) suggests, replaces the role of traditional 
editors in the selection and distribution of content, provid-
ing a seemingly more “objective” model based on the arti-
ficial-intellectual (AI) computation of user data rather than 
on editors’ “subjective” preferences.6 The most important 
distinguishing characteristic of Kuaishou is that the majority 
of its users consist of rural or third and fourth-tiered city-
based, uneducated young Chinese (Huo, 2016). As we will 
show, Kuaishou enabled this group to become an “unlikely 
creative class,” actively performing their vernacular creativ-
ity (Burgess, 2006) through self-taught skills. In addition, 
they use the digital system of Kuaishou to monetize their 
creative production through advertising and e-commerce. At 
first sight, Kuaishou’s platform content business and its 
“unlikely creative class” seem to fit comfortably with the 
state’s expectation of “mass entrepreneurship.”
However, the challenge for Kuaishou is that its user-gener-
ated content has to be in line with the authorities’ expectations 
of “what kind of stories should be told.” This is especially 
challenging because the stakes are high: “Internet+” is not 
just about “restructuring the economy,” but also about restruc-
turing culture and society. The Chinese authorities have been 
eager to promote a carefully curated national imagery to 
wield “soft power” on the global stage on the one hand, while 
expecting a conforming culture that ensures social stability 
and national unity on the other. As Wanning Sun (2010, p. 66) 
highlights, this refers to a double agenda: to “globally present 
[China] as a player whose values, ethics, and sensibilities are 
compatible with . . . its international counterparts,” while 
domestically “avoid[ing] ‘chaos’ at all cost, including heavy-
handed censorship, in order to ensure social stability and 
national unity.” This double agenda applies to Chinese digital 
platforms. The platformed cultural production system puts 
users at the center of production, endowing content producers 
with more autonomy. Yet, as long as these platforms operate 
domestically, they are not immune to censorship or the state’s 
demand for a compliant culture. According to the CAC, all 
types of content providers should “abide by the law, adhere 
to the correct values, and help disseminate socialist core 
values and cultivate a positive and healthy on-line culture” 
(CAC, 2017b). As the central supervisory entity for the 
Chinese Internet communication sectors, the CAC is a pow-
erful government agency under the leadership of the Central 
Cyberspace Affairs Commission, headed directly by the 
Chinese president Xi Jinping. Founded in 2014, the CAC has 
promulgated over 15 policy documents on the regulation of a 
variety of online content production services, from social 
media to search engines, mobile applications (APP), and 
online news production. Apart from demanding that all content 
production and distribution adhere to the law and official ide-
ology, these documents also specify regulations on employee 
management and user registration, as well as punitive mea-
sures for any breaches of these regulations. According to the 
requirements, platform companies are fully responsible for all 
content circulated and will be “interviewed” (约谈yuetan)—
the code word for this in China is being invited for tea—when 
any of it violates the law or regulations. For example, in April 
2018, Kuaishou and Toutiao were both “invited for tea” by 
the CAC for “ignorance of the law and disseminating pro-
grams that are against social moral values” (Liu, 2018). The 
CAC required the two companies to effect a “comprehensive 
rectification.” As a result, their websites and apps shut down 
thousands of user accounts, including Tian You’s, for posting 
“unhealthy content” and set up special official accounts for 
disseminating “positive and healthy values.”
Thus, under the policy agenda of “Internet+” and “Mass 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation,” the state’s aspiration of 
economic restructuring drives but also shapes the platformi-
zation of Chinese cultural production. The state–corporate 
relationship is largely complicated due to the state’s dual con-
cern with economic restructuring and cultural regulation 
and social stability. This state–commerce relationship renders 
Kuaishou’s content production acutely contingent and, we 
argue, distinguishes the platformization of cultural produc-
tion in contemporary China from that in the West and consti-
tutes a third dimension to what Nieborg and Poell (2018, p. 2) 
summarize as the “contingency” of platform cultural produc-
tion. According to Nieborg and Poell (2018), this contingency 
is consisted of “platform dependency” and “contingent com-
modities.” The former refers to the dominant power of only a 
few platforms, such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, 
and Microsoft (GAFAM) in the West and Baidu, Alibaba, and 
Tencent (BAT) in China, which “allow[s] content developers 
to systematically track and profile the activities and prefer-
ences of billions of users.” The latter refers to how platforms’ 
content commodities are made continually “malleable, modu-
lar in design, and informed by datafied user feedback, open to 
constant revision and recirculation” (Nieborg & Poell, 2018, 
p. 2). The power of the state, in the case of China, engenders 
a third dimension of contingency that constantly shapes the 
practice of cultural production on Chinese platforms. But 
how is this contingency further translated in the digital affor-
dances of Kuaishou? How does this networked platform gov-
ernance affect the creator subjectivity and culture produced 
on the platform? The following two sections will address 
these questions.
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Walking Through Kuaishou: 
Algorithmic and Digital Governance
Under the algorithmic logic, Kuaishou forges an ostensibly 
decentralizing and democratic system for content produc-
tion and selection. In principle, everyone is treated equally 
by the algorithmic machine, whether they are a movie star 
or a migrant worker. The key for content production is to 
obtain as much online traffic through the creative content as 
possible. According to the online archives of the Kuaishou 
webpage7 and its update records in Apple’s app store, 
Kuaishou has described itself through slogans like “some-
thing interesting” and “record the world, record you” 
(2016–2018). On its webpage, three sentences appear under 
this new slogan:
discover a real but interesting world
be loyal to the self while not feeling lonely
the same town with the same mood
Such lines conjure up ideas of worlding, of the self, and of 
locality, thus grounding the contents offered in the everyday 
realities of China. The images shared on the webpage and in 
the app store further strengthen that sense of everydayness: 
ordinary young Chinese are captured on everyday occasions, 
while traveling, at home, with pets or babies, and so on. 
Keywords like “real,” “self,” “interesting,” and “same,” 
together with the photos, are indicative of the vision of 
Kuaishou: to invite “grassroots individuals” to discover and 
share the interesting moments in their own and others “real” 
everyday lives (Figure 1). By promising an interesting, real, 
individualized but not lonely online community, Kuaishou 
absorbs users’ creativity into its platform economy.
Kuaishou is a free app and its revenue sources consist 
mainly of in-app advertising and a gifting economy through 
live streaming. As a typical content platform that connects 
multi-sided markets, Kuaishou offers two ways for advertis-
ing. The first one is called “fans headline” (粉丝头条 fensi 
toutiao), which allows content producers to promote their 
video content on the platform. According to the app’s descrip-
tion, by paying RMB37.9 a posted video can gain an increase 
of 10,000 views from end-users. Producers can simply click 
on the “fans headline” button under the settings menu of the 
app interface. Another form of advertising is offered to third-
party companies or brands that intend to buy advertising 
space on the interface. Commercials are mixed with user-
generated videos and fed to targeted viewers by the algorithm. 
Kuaishou has not publicly specified the cost of its advertising 
space, but a new media agency discloses (Zhiyuan 2018) 
that, apart from the one-off service fee of RMB5,600, adver-
tisers pay RMB0.2 for each click.8 Another important revenue 
source comes from the gifting economy in Kuaishou’s live-
streaming service. Only a select group of users are authorized 
to live stream on the platform. Streamers interact with their 
fans during the show and fans use kuaibi (快币), a virtual cur-
rency on Kuaishou, to buy and send virtual gifts to their 
favorite streamers. An amount of RMB1 can buy 10 kuaibi 
and the price of a virtual gift varies from 1 to 188 kuaibi. 
According to the platform’s regulations, after deducting 20% 
for tax, the platform company earns half of the gifting income 
while streamers only obtain less than 40%. Clearly, Kuaishou’s 
business model is largely dependent on how much data and 
data traffic the platform can collect from users. The more 
popular its contents are, the higher financial returns the plat-
form and its complementors can achieve.
Kuaishou has a simple interface. One can use email or 
social media account such as Wechat, Weibo, Facebook, or 
Google for registration.9 There are three tabs on the main inter-
face: “following” (关注guanzhu), “trending” (发现faxian), 
Figure 1. Vision of Kuaishou (screenshot from Kuaishou’s official 
website, August 2018).
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and “nearby” (同城tongcheng) (Figure 2). The default tab is 
“trending,” which lists videos selected and pushed by the rec-
ommendation algorithm. There is no category selection button 
under the tap and videos appearing here seem to be randomly 
selected. After using the app for a while, the streaming list will 
be updated and fed with new contents that are further calcu-
lated by the algorithm. Most of these videos are “trending”: 
the majority of them have obtained at least hundreds of likes 
and most of them were posted that day. The fifth video is usu-
ally some product advertisement. The number of videos and 
their genres will increase as the app is used over time. Under 
the “following” tab, content is listed in chronological order 
from the accounts followed by the user. The recommendation 
algorithm is not applied here, since the user’s preferences are 
quite clear. For content producers, this tab provides a window 
to interact directly and continuously with their target audience. 
The “nearby” tab arranges videos based on the geoloca-
tional distance between video makers and end-users. The 
platform gives priority in this tab to accounts that have 
bought “fans headline” services and accounts that are live 
streaming. By adding a geolocational feature to the stream-
ing system, the platform takes the opportunity of exploiting 
users’ offline real-life social networks, which might create 
more user engagement.
To post content on Kuaishou, users do not need to change 
to a different account. By simply clicking on the camera icon 
above the interface (Figure 2), they can upload and post a 
short video up to 57 s long. Users can use smart phones to 
capture real-time moments and edit them with background 
music or animation effects provided by the app. They can 
also use the app to publicize pre-made, more professional 
content. As with other Chinese Internet service providers, a 
mobile phone number is needed for verification. Before they 
can be streamed, all videos uploaded to the database will be 
analyzed by the algorithmic system. According to the three 
algorithm engineers and computer scientists interviewed, the 
algorithmic recommendation system of Chinese platforms 
has four basic components: content analysis, user analysis, 
evaluation, and security auditing. The first two use computa-
tion models to analyze and classify various content and user 
data. Based on this datafication, diverse content is tagged 
and distributed automatically among users who are predicted 
by the algorithm as target groups. The evaluation component 
fixes and optimizes the recommendation system based on the 
feedback from its previous operation. Finally, the security 
auditing component checks, filters, and censors all kinds of 
online content, including that provided by content producers 
and interactive content such as end-user comments. Through 
AI machine learning, the auditing system will achieve 
increasing accuracy. This is only a simplistic summary of the 
algorithm recommendation system. The technical compo-
nents are very complicated and require enormous financial 
investment. For security auditing systems in particular, AI is 
not yet safe enough, meaning that Chinese platform compa-
nies often hire manual teams for online censorship. The 
state’s requirement of a “positive,” “healthy” Internet culture 
thus increases the operational costs for these platforms. For 
instance, one of Kuaishou’s human resource managers told 
us that it recently recruited 3,000 new employees in branches 
in Harbin, Chengdu, Yancheng, Tianjin, and Wuhan to con-
duct manual censorship and online surveillance.
Verified “legal” content will then be pushed to a small 
group of end-users for the first-round feeding—including 
geographically nearby users, subscribers, and those predicted 
by the AI system as “potentially interested users.” After the 
first 24 hr, the system will evaluate the content based on the 
feedback of user interactive data and decide whether the con-
tent is worthy of a second- or third-round push. If one buys 
the “fans headline” service, the posted video will receive the 
purchased amount of data traffic. As the platform’s most 
valuable asset, the data traffic generated by the content will 
Figure 2. Screenshot of Kuaishou interface (August 2018).
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bring subscriptions, high interactivity, and subsequent adver-
tising opportunities for the account holder. If their account 
remains highly active for weeks, achieves a large amount of 
subscriptions, and has no history of violating the user regula-
tions of the platform, content producers can contact the cus-
tomer service for authorization of a live-streaming function. 
According to the platform’s regulations, there are three stan-
dards for the evaluation of such an application: the account 
should have a high interactivity, including continuous 
uploading of original content with a large number of follow-
ers and online interactions; the account adds to the positive 
image of the platform and does not have any record of violat-
ing the regulations; and users should link their account to a 
mobile phone number to eliminate the risk of being hacked. 
In 2017 and early 2018, Kuaishou stirred discussion among 
the public and was “interviewed” by the CAC due to some 
online hosts’ “vulgar” and “unhealthy” behaviors during live 
streaming. As a result, the platform has become more cau-
tious in regulating the live-streaming service. The ambigu-
ous rhetoric of the regulations gives it ample leeway and 
power to control and manage the live-streaming service in 
accordance with its own interests and those of the state.
The algorithmic system and its immense database remain 
largely invisible to content producers and Kuaishou holds a 
powerful position in its platform system, similar to that of 
Instagram. The company never discloses any technical 
details of its algorithms to users. In addition, content produc-
ers only have very limited access to interactive data, such as 
the number of followers, comments, and likes, through the 
app’s user interface. They can check their followers’ public 
homepage but detailed user data such as demographic and 
behavior information are not available. Apart from restric-
tions on illegal or malicious content that violates Chinese 
law, the Kuaishou user agreement also prohibits users from 
any unauthorized commercial activities such as selling prod-
ucts or private advertisements. By posting any content on the 
platform, users automatically grant the Kuaishou company
a world-wide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, sub-licensable and 
perpetual (unless withdrawn expressly by you) license, to use 
the content uploaded (including but not limited to copy, publish, 
release, as well as adapt, reproduce, translate, transmit, perform 
and display in original form or other forms). (Kuaishou 2018)
This user agreement patently panders to the company’s 
commercial interests and to the Chinese state’s requirement 
of a conforming and “positive” culture. Any violation would 
lead to punishments such as changing and deleting posted 
content or suspending and terminating the user’s ability to 
use Kuaishou.
At a time when the state government is tightening its con-
trol over the cultural and media sectors, Kuaishou and other 
platforms will also reinforce their management of online 
content. This underlines the unequal relationship between 
creators and the platform company. Content producers have 
to meticulously manage their creativity to ensure the accu-
mulation of online data traffic without breaching the plat-
form’s regulations. The governance of digital platforms 
creates a pervasive sense of uncertainty and insecurity 
among content producers. In the face of this, many content 
creators feel obliged to post some sentences on their home-
page expressing their appreciation of Kuaishou, such as 
“thank you Kuaishou for providing such a wonderful plat-
form,” “I support Kuaishou for transmitting positive value,” 
and so on (Figure 3).
Our analysis so far shows that the algorithm-based system 
of Kuaishou epitomizes the platform contingency caused by 
the special state–platform relationship, which, as indicated 
earlier, distinguishes the Chinese platformization of cultural 
production from that in the West. As a result, platform gover-
nance is subject to state regulatory power, both promoting 
Figure 3. Screenshot of one user’s homepage (August 2018).
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and circumscribing the platformed cultural production. The 
algorithmic machine allows Kuaishou to achieve a maximal 
incorporation of creativity from “grassroots individuals,” but 
state–platform contingency also sets limits to the automation 
of platform governance, for example, in requiring manual 
censorship. But how do creators then deal with this contin-
gency and the need to navigate the tightrope between censor-
ship and creativity, between production and commodification, 
between subjectivity and being subjected?
Unlikely Makers, Unlikely Aesthetics?
Wang Qian grew up in the countryside of Dazhou, Sichuan, 
a province in west China. After graduating from middle 
school at the age of 15, he followed his relatives and went 
to Shenzhen, becoming a factory worker. In 2016, inspired 
by the stories of people making money through Kuaishou, 
he quit his job at the factory and decided to become a 
Kuaishou creator. Naming himself as “brother Qian” 
(qiange谦哥), he performs and teaches magic tricks through 
short video and live streaming. Wearing a stylish hat and 
facial make-up, Wang Qian performs like a professional 
magician on Kuaishou through his self-taught skills learned 
from the Internet. After 2 years, his account had over 1 mil-
lion subscriptions. This large fan base allows him to sell 
and advertise magic props through the platform. As Wang 
Qian disclosed in our interview, his digital business gener-
ates an average sale of RMB70,000 per month. Deducting 
production costs and salaries for his assistants, Wang’s 
monthly income can reach RMB50,000 (€6,000). Compared 
to his previous factory work, the new job has not only mul-
tiplied earnings, but has also changed his appearance and 
identity: he seems to have got rid of the stigmatizing label 
of “migrant worker” and become part of the affluent, fash-
ionable, and popular “online celebrities” (wanghong网红). 
Through Kuaishou, Wang has jumped from the “sweat 
shop” in Shenzhen into the urban creative class.
Wang Qian’s experience is not uncommon on Kuaishou. 
In Li et al.’s (2019, p. 13) study of the use of Kuaishou among 
a group of rural students, the video-sharing app is seen to 
allow these low-income rural youths a way to “express their 
resistance against education” through the circulation and pro-
duction of the “shehui ren” (社会人, society man) subcul-
ture. As it did for Wang Qian, Kuaishou promises these rural 
youths an upward socio-economic mobility through capital-
izing on their memories and creativity in the production of the 
shehui ren subculture.
Its massive popularity among the Chinese rural popula-
tion, and the produced culture and aesthetics, significantly 
distinguish Kuaishou from other Chinese and Western social 
media platforms. Most Kuaishou users are from the urban 
lower social class and young people from rural society, 
enabled by Kuaishou to “record the world and themselves.” 
According to a manager from Kuaishou, the company 
has never tried to sign or promote any particular “online 
celebrity.” Instead, the platform embraces an aesthetics of 
the vernacular, which can be described as foregrounding
the un-hip, the un-cool, and possibly the downright square, [it] 
embraces those marginal and non-glamorous creative practices 
excluded from arts- and culture-based regeneration. Vernacular 
forms of creativity are neither extraordinary not spectacular . . . 
but are part of a range of mundane, intensely social practices. 
(Edensor, Leslie, Millington, & Rantisi, 2009, p. 10; see also 
Burgess, 2006)
To further explicate this vernacular aesthetics circulated 
on Kuaishou, we selected and analyzed 200 trending videos 
and the everyday user activities of 20 popular Kuaishou 
accounts. These selected short videos constitute what Lauren 
Berlant has called a “silly archive,” which may be “the silli-
est, most banal, and . . . of erratic logic” in the everyday 
experiences of ordinary citizens (Berlant, 1997, p. 12). It is 
precisely its “very improvisatory ephemerality,” its “very 
popularity,” and “its effects” on everyday life, according to 
Berlant (1997, p. 12) that makes such a silly archive worthy 
of serious reading.
In our selection of videos, we observed five recurring 
genres of content:
1. Everyday life: cooking, cosmetics, pets, family life, 
and so on;
2. Country life: fishing, hunting, crafts, vernacular 
landscape, and so on;
3. Creative skills: singing, magic, dancing, fitness, pro-
fessional skills, and so on;
4. Fiction micro film;
5. “Positive value content” mostly produced by official 
sponsored accounts.
For the first four genres, the idea of “grassrootsness” is cru-
cial; it is performed to add “authenticity” to the videos, mak-
ing them look more real and closer to the audience’s own 
life. For Wang Qian, behind his polished appearance in the 
videos, such grassrootsness is demonstrated by his accent 
and his way of performing magic. Unlike professional magi-
cians, he shows only forms of magic that he learned from the 
Internet. More than that, he also unveils and teaches magic to 
his fans. In one of his videos, he remarks at the end: “Come 
on brothers. With this trick you will find a girlfriend!”
Other video makers also choose to deliberately display 
their underclass identity, through their accent, dress, skin 
color, or behavior. For instance, in a series of videos showing 
cosmetic skills, the female model has quite dark skin and 
chubby cheeks, which does not meet the current standard in 
China for a “beautiful girl.” Thanks to the skilful use of cos-
metic techniques and the special products, the model has her 
appearance drastically changed, with fairer skin and slimmer 
face. Her new look (Figure 4) is still not comparable to that 
of professional models in television advertisements, yet sim-
ilar videos are quite popular on Kuaishou and within a few 
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hours can easily gain hundreds and thousands of likes from 
users. The secret to the high popularity is precisely the 
“grassrootsness” and “authenticity” they aim to represent: 
not every ordinary person is born with the beauty of a movie 
star, yet, by virtue of the “right” make-up and techniques, 
video makers convince their audience that they too can 
change their imperfect physical appearance. On the homep-
age of another account named “Zhang Deshuai,” the video 
maker identifies himself as a “country lad” (农村小伙nong-
cun xiaohuo) and posts homemade micro films. These films 
usually choose shabby villages as a background and tell 
amusing stories about relationships, family life, friendship, 
and so on. However, in contrast to the rural landscape shown, 
the cast members in these videos always dress in a trendy 
fashion with a stylish haircut, while the entertaining story 
lines are not necessarily about “country life.” The characters 
in the films often talk about “watching movies,” “shopping,” 
“drinking milk tea,” and “buying a car.” While choosing 
rurality as their background, these films also push the limits 
of rurality and intentionally parody the trendy life of Chinese 
urban youth. From Wang Qian’s magic demonstrations and 
the popular cosmetic videos to these self-made fiction films, 
the aesthetics of the videos on Kuaishou articulate the imagi-
nation of Chinese “grassroots individuals” who are margin-
alized in mainstream popular culture. It is this imagination 
from the marginal that fascinates many Kuaishou users, who 
more or less experience this grassrootsness and marginaliza-
tion in their own everyday lives.
At the same time, as we pointed out in the previous sec-
tion, content production on Kuaishou is not immune to state 
surveillance. Since being interviewed by the CAC in April 
2018, “positive and healthy values” guide content regulation 
on the platform. The once very popular “crazy videos,” such 
as those depicting adolescent pregnancy and self-abuse, have 
been banned and deleted. The platform has also established a 
new genre of “positive-value” content. Apart from its 
own official account, “Kuaishou positive value” (快手正能
量Kuaishou zheng nengliang), the platform invites govern-
ment institutions such as public security bureaus to open 
accounts and post videos on “everyday ethical models,” 
“Chinese economic achievements,” “the positive image of sol-
diers and the police,” “the official policy and ideology,” and so 
on. The algorithmic system has been set to support the videos 
uploaded by these accounts, which is why, in August 2018, 
they featured 7 out of the 10 most viewed videos on Kuaishou 
(Short Video Factory, 2018).
In this regard, content producers on Kuaishou have to 
meticulously calculate their creativity, to remain in line with 
the platform’s so-called “value orientation” while also mak-
ing their content attractive to the online audience. Moreover, 
for creators, the platform and its digital affordances not only 
denote a way of performing creativity but also an effective 
tool for making money and building a career. Data traffic 
becomes a crucial asset that every creative producer aspires 
to accumulate in as high a quantity as possible. To do so, they 
first need to understand and utilize the various digital affor-
dances of the platforms. They should, for example, update 
their accounts on an everyday basis. From their profile photo 
to their user name, everything that can give end-users a sense 
of what the account is about needs to be deliberately designed 
and optimized. To be creative through the digital, one has to 
know what, how, and when to create, and for whom. The 
constant posting and streaming also requires good time man-
agement skills. On Kuaishou, producers normally choose to 
post their videos in the evening around 8 p.m., a time when 
most high-school students, one of the largest user groups on 
Kuaishou, are at home and have just finished their home-
work. What Melissa Gregg (2011, p. 2) identifies as the 
“presence bleed”—how digital and communication technol-
ogies enable “work to invade places and times that were once 
less susceptible to its presence”—becomes imperative for 
platform-based creative work. The aim of this intensified and 
extensified10 (Jarvis & Pratt, 2006) work for content produc-
ers is to generate profits, which also leads to users’ appro-
priation of the digital technologies for their own business 
purposes. Although Kuaishou prohibits unauthorized adver-
tising and commercial activities, video makers can still find 
their own ways to avoid the platform’s supervision. Some 
streamers integrate contextual advertisements for third-party 
merchants in their short video and live-streaming perfor-
mances. For example, someone posts videos of their pets on 
Kuaishou and lists their Wechat account number on the 
homepage to sell pet food, using acronyms such as “WX” or 
icons like “V ❤” as a substitute for Wechat (微信weixin) to 
dodge the platform’s AI monitoring (Figure 3).
At the same time, the high interactivity of the digital plat-
form requires content producers not only to strategize their 
creativity for business purposes, but also to manage their 
Figure 4. Before and after using the makeups (screenshot of 
one selected video, August 2018).
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affects and personality to cultivate intimacy with their target 
users and audience. On Kuaishou, a phrase that appears fre-
quently in short videos is “Come on bro! Double tap 666! 
Follow me.” The action of double tapping on a video equals 
a “like” from a viewer and “666” in Mandarin is homophonic 
to liu (溜), meaning “cool” or “awesome.” These words are 
often spoken in a euphoric tone with local accents. The aim 
is to add a sense of authenticity to the videos and develop 
intimacy with the audience. Like the musicians studied by 
Nancy Baym (2015), Kuaishou streamers are involved in 
relational labor, involving an “ongoing communication with 
audiences over time to build social relationships that foster 
paid work” (Baym, 2018, p. 16). To gain more popularity and 
subscriptions, one of the relational strategies used by content 
producers is to set up a special renshe (人设, character)—
to perform a certain personality—through various creative 
practices that will affect and create intimacy with viewers, 
who will later become their followers, or fans. As is exempli-
fied by the above videos analyzed, on Kuaishou, a personal-
ity is carefully nurtured and maintained through performing 
“grassroots authenticity.” A frequent discourse that emerges 
out of these diverse stylizations is that of being “real-life” 
and “jiediqi” (接地气, down to earth), underlining how the 
personalities created should be relevant, if not identical, to 
those of the platform’s users.
As a result, on Kuaishou, platformed cultural production 
is entangled with the production of affects. These affects, 
such as “a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excite-
ment or passion,” are produced through the labor process of 
platformization, “expressing a certain state of body along 
with a certain mode of thinking” (Hardt & Negri, 2004, 
p. 108). By exploiting the various digital affordances and 
renshe, “grassroots” content producers have, on the one hand, 
become self-employed creative entrepreneurs for whom 
creativity, life, and individuality are constantly calculated 
according to the accounting of costs and profits. On the 
other hand, in the everyday production and management of 
affect through the digital affordances provided by Kuaishou, 
these creative individuals also become aspirational creative 
workers (Duffy, 2016, p. 441) motivated by the platform’s 
“promise of social and economic capital; yet the reward 
system for these aspirants is highly uneven.” A data-driven 
economy becomes the common model that drives all the 
parts becoming complementors of the platform. Data and 
datafication matters not only for giant corporations and 
institutions (van Dijck, 2014), but they also become cru-
cial production tools and assets for these new, “unlikely” 
creative subjects on Kuaishou.
Conclusion
This article has studied a special group of creative workers—
the content creators on the Chinese social media platform 
Kuaishou, enabled by the emerging Chinese platform creative 
economy. It first examined the state–platform contingency 
caused by the complicated relationship between Kuaishou 
and the state governance of culture and economy, and how 
such contingency is embedded in the digital algorithmic sys-
tem of the platform. This third dimension of platform contin-
gency distinguishes the functioning ecology of Chinese 
media platforms from those in the West. This contingency 
maximizes the subsumption of individual vernacular creativ-
ity in China’s platform creative economy, while also enabling 
marginalized “grassroots” Chinese to become “unlikely” 
creative workers.
At the same time, through this production of an “unlikely” 
creative class, the platformization of cultural production 
accommodates the Chinese state’s “entrepreneurial solution-
ism” (Keane & Chen, 2019), which, exemplified by the 
state’s policy on Internet+ and Mass Entrepreneurship, takes 
digital technology and entrepreneurship as the solution to 
China’s social, economic, and cultural problems. The plat-
form economy thus provides opportunities for “grassroots 
individuals” from diverse backgrounds to become creative 
workers, pandering to the state’s goal of restructuring the 
economy.
Importantly, this grassroots digital entrepreneurship has 
also transcended the passive “digital labor” and “prosumer” 
models some critical politic economists have identified 
(Fuchs, 2010; Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010). Despite the institu-
tional regulation and censorship of the Internet, these grass-
roots creators actively participate in the Chinese platform 
creative economy, appropriating the algorithmic digital sys-
tem and negotiating with the state/platform governance to 
achieve their own creative and financial aims. Within their 
experiences of creation and monetization, their relational 
labor through which they create a connection and intimacy 
with their audiences (Baym, 2018), we can find moments of 
play, if not resistance. Moments in which the official narra-
tive of the “China Dream” is juxtaposed to multiple dreams 
from actors that hardly ever get a face or a voice in Chinese 
mainstream media.
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Notes
 1. In rapper culture, MC stands for “Microphone Controller” or 
“Master of Ceremonies,” often used as title for skilled rappers. 
Tian You chooses this title to identify himself as a Chinese 
rapper.
 2. Hanmai literally means “shouting with microphone.” Chinese 
online rappers like Tian You created and performed it. These 
self-claimed MCs shout out rhythmed lyrics, usually rephrased 
in classical Chinese with some popular online slangs, in high-
beat music.
 3. There are three methods we adopted for the selection of videos 
and accounts. To minimize any personal preference, we first 
use a new account to download the first 20 videos listed under 
the “trending” tab for 7 days. The second collection of vid-
eos are selected from the first 20 accounts on the ranking list 
of “the most popular live streamers on Kuaishou,” provided 
by Xiaohulu.com, an intermediary company offering data 
analysis and operation service for creators on major Chinese 
platforms. The final selection of videos is consisted of the 10 
mostly viewed videos on Kuaishou in August 2018, data pro-
vided by another intermediary company “short video factory.”
 4. All of them are private companies and receive financial 
investment from Chinese Internet giants Baidu, Tencent, and 
Alibaba. The headquarters of Kuaishou Company is located 
in Beijing and receives investment from Baidu, Tencent, and 
several other venture capital firms.
 5. The notion of “grassroots individuals” (草根caogen) resonates 
with the often used “common people” (老百姓laobaixin). 
While we use the term in quotation marks for its prevalence 
in Chinese discourses, we are aware that these are highly 
problematic terms that produce a binary division in society 
between the people and the elite, ignoring further stratifica-
tions and more subtle class differences, and hence our use of 
quotes when using the term.
 6. We will come back to examine the technical and algorithm 
system of Kuaishou in the following section.
 7. See https://www.Kuaishou.com/
 8. Kuaishou does not sell advertisement of financial, medical 
products, or other social media platforms.
 9. It is quite ironic that a China-based platform includes both 
Facebook and Google in its registration interface; this shows 
how the censorship toward both is anything but clear-cut or 
univocal.
10. According to Jarvis and Pratt (2006), contemporary media and 
cultural industries give rise to an increasing extensification of 
work, referring to the distribution or exporting of work across 
divergent spaces/scales and times.
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